Is Islamic State Bengal Province in the Making?
The Caliphate’s Lingering Shadow over Bangladesh
Recent jihadist propaganda materials from the so-called Al-Bengal Media, a seemingly unofficial Islamic State mouthpiece, suggest an intensified ideological push to establish a wilayat (province) in Bengal. These efforts, rooted in IS's broader ambitions to maintain its global foothold despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, warrant a closer examination. Is an Islamic State Bengal truly in the making, or are these just remnants of a dwindling jihadist movement struggling to stay relevant?
Poster Propaganda: A Renewed Push?
The hitherto unknown ‘Al-Bengal Media’ posters released for the first time on January 20, 2025, reflect a calculated attempt to revive the caliphate dream in Bengal (Bangladesh and Bengali-speaking region in Northeast India). Titles like “Suffering in Chains” and “In the Hands of an Angry Lion” depict a sense of victimhood, calling upon the Bengali-speaking Muslim community to act against perceived oppression. Another poster, “Roar”, glorifies the so-called golden age of the Caliphate, urging adherents to reignite past fervour.
These posters employ a religious and ideological justification, attempting to align IS actions with Islamic history and theological principles. They also portray jihad as a necessary retaliation, framing IS fighters as the only force capable of delivering justice. The victimhood narrative, which is central to most Islamist narratives, depicts Muslims as victims of state persecution, wrongful imprisonment, and systematic oppression by secular regimes, with specific references to Muslim detainees suffering in various countries. The call to action urges supporters to rise against these perceived injustices, encouraging active involvement in IS’s cause. Additionally, the localization of jihadist messaging through Bengali script and references to Bengal highlights a strategic effort to radicalize Bengali-speaking individuals and expand IS’s influence in the region.
The historical and political context further reinforces this agenda, as the post-2024 political instability in Bangladesh and the consolidation of Islamist forces create an environment ripe for jihadist recruitment. This propaganda serves as a tool to exploit local grievances and government weaknesses, fostering a sense of urgency among potential recruits. While not unprecedented in jihadist propaganda, these messages signify an emerging trend—localization of the IS ideology to fit the Bengali context. IS has long used propaganda in regional languages to recruit and radicalize, with Bengali-language materials surfacing in the past. However, the latest attempts point to an evolving strategy to consolidate ideological influence in Bangladesh, Bengali-speaking neighbouring West Bengal (India), and the broader subcontinent.
Echoes of Holy Artisan Attack: The IS Footprint in Bangladesh
The possibility of an IS province in Bengal must be contextualized with its past activities in the region. The most significant IS-linked attack in Bangladesh remains the July 1, 2016, Holey Artisan Bakery siege, where IS jihadists stormed a café in Dhaka, killing 22 people, mostly foreigners. IS central swiftly claimed responsibility, releasing images of the attackers posing with black flags. While Bangladeshi authorities attributed the attack to the local outfit Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) faction, the event underscored IS’s influence in radicalizing segments of the youth. Despite continued crackdowns, sporadic arrests, and militant operations, IS-inspired cells remain active in Bangladesh. While the country has largely managed to contain large-scale IS operations, the group’s ideology persists, often mutating into different forms, including online radicalization and lone-wolf attacks.
Long before the July 2016 attack, the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine had already confirmed its presence in Bangladesh, signalling its malevolent intentions, growing influence, and covert operations in the region. This IS propaganda outlet provided extensive coverage of its activities, notably in Dabiq No. 14 (April 2016), which featured an interview with Shaykh Abu Ibrahim Al-Hanif, the leader of The Khilafa’s Soldiers in Bengal. Similarly, Dabiq No. 12 (November 2015) published The Revival of Jihad in Bengal, an article that detailed prior IS-inspired or guided attacks in the country. During this period, there was a sharp escalation in targeted killings—foreign nationals, intellectuals, and members of the minority Shia and Ahmadiyya communities became frequent victims, alongside fatal attacks on Hindu priests and Christian pastors. However, the government largely remained in denial, dismissing the rise of IS as an external phenomenon despite clear evidence of imported jihadist ideology colluding with homegrown extremist networks. By the time the Holey Artisan attack occurred, IS’s violent ideology had already taken root, gaining momentum within Bangladesh’s religiously charged environment, regardless of the terror group’s physical presence.
The ambition to establish an IS Bengal province aligns with IS’s broader regional strategy under the banner of Wilayat Khorasan (Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP). Operating primarily from Afghanistan, ISKP has sought to expand its reach beyond its traditional strongholds. With Pakistan experiencing a surge in ISKP-linked attacks and India witnessing occasional arrests of IS-affiliated operatives, Bangladesh and India’s West Bengal could emerge as key battlegrounds. However, unlike Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, where ISKP controls specific territories, Bangladesh remains a challenging environment for large-scale jihadist operations. The Bangladeshi government has responded with aggressive counterterrorism measures, dismantling IS-affiliated cells and neutralizing major threats, preventing the group from establishing a permanent foothold—at least for now.
Opportune moment?
The political landscape in Bangladesh has been in flux since August 2024, following the post-Hasina era, marked by governance instability, opposition-led protests, and factional infighting. The weakening grip of the Awami League and the resurgence of Islamist political forces, including factions aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami and other hardline groups, have created an environment ripe for jihadist resurgence. As state institutions grapple with internal discord, security gaps have widened, allowing extremist networks to regroup, recruit, and expand their influence. This period of transition has also emboldened pro-Islamic State elements, who see the political vacuum as an opportunity to advance their Wilayat Bengal aspirations, leveraging local grievances and Islamist consolidation to reignite their jihadist ambitions. Without decisive counterterrorism efforts, this instability could catalyze a renewed cycle of extremist violence in the region.
In May 2019, the Islamic State Central expanded its regional influence by announcing the creation of two new provinces: Islamic State Hind Province (ISHP) and Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP). This move supplemented its existing Khorasan Province (ISKP) and aimed at consolidating pro-IS jihadist entities across South Asia. By establishing these provinces, IS sought to enhance recruitment efforts and operational capabilities in the region, capitalizing on local militant networks. The formation of ISHP and ISPP also appeared to be a strategic manoeuvre to reinforce IS-K’s position after the group's territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria in April 2019, ensuring its continued presence and influence despite the loss of its self-declared caliphate. IS Bengal would serve that expansionist ambition.
The Road Ahead: A Battle of Ideologies
· While IS’s dreams of a Wilayat Bengal remain largely aspirational, the threat posed by localized radicalization is real.
· The emergence of Al-Bengal Media signals an ongoing ideological battle that the Bangladesh government (or, for that matter, governments in the Indian subcontinent ) must address proactively.
· Digital counterterrorism (platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram are replete with Islamist content/influencers) measures are needed to combat IS’s propaganda outreach. Bengali-language jihadist materials have been steadily increasing, necessitating stronger monitoring of online radicalization.
· Regional intelligence sharing should be enhanced between India, Bangladesh, and other stakeholders to curb cross-border militant movements.
· Community engagement and de-radicalization efforts must be strengthened to prevent vulnerable youth from falling prey to IS recruitment.
Conclusion: A Phantom Province or an Emerging Threat?
The emergence of Al-Bengal Media and renewed jihadist rhetoric suggest IS’s persistent ambition to keep its ideological flames burning in the region. Whether this translates into an actual operational Wilayat Bengal remains uncertain. However, Jihadist history warns us against any complacency. The 2016 Holey Artisan attack was dismissed initially as an isolated incident—only for it to reveal deep-seated jihadist networks later in the country and in the region as well (e.g. Sri Lanka, Easter Sunday Attacks, April 2019).
Governments and security agencies must take these signals seriously, ensuring that IS’s latest propaganda push does not materialize into something deadlier. The dream of the Caliphate may be fading, but its embers continue to smoulder—waiting for the right conditions to ignite once again.
Animesh Roul is the executive director of the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, a policy research group based in New Delhi. Email: animeshroul@gmail.com